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Ginsburg: The Progression of Women in the Law

Essays
THE PROGRESSION OF WOMEN IN THE LAW
RUTH BADER GINSBURG*

Justice Ginsburg has honored us with the privilege of printing a collection
of her remarks and writings. The following series ofpassages demonstrates the
progression of women in the law, from Justice Ginsburg's perspective, during
the past twenty-three years. Women entering the legal profession today should
be encouraged that she can describe this progress as "the exhilarating change
I have had the good fortune to witness. "'
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Ruth Bader Ginsburgpaved the way for
the Supreme Court to reconsiderits analysis of sex discriminationand adopt an
intermediate level of scrutinyfor constitutionalchallenges to sex discrimination
under the Equal Protection Clause.2 As director of the ACLU's Women's Rights
Project, then-Professor Ginsburg struggled to establish precedent that would
ensure equal treatment by the government regardless of sex. 3
In 1971, Professor Ginsburg published her remarks from that year's
Association of American Law Schools Conference with the Valparaiso University
Law Review, focusing on the status of women in law schools.4 She advocated
for law schools to eliminatefrom textbooks and classrooms attempts at comic
relief via stereotyped gender characterizations. Additionally, she supported the
integrationinto the curriculum of materials on sex-based discrimination.5
In 1982, noting the increased numbers of women entering law schools,
then-Judge Ginsburg of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia encouraged members of the legal profession not to stereotype women
lawyers as social workers and "backstagers," out of the realm of the adversarial
" Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court.
1. Letter from Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Lisa S. Meyer, Editor in Chief, Valparaiso

University Law Review (Feb. 7, 1994).
2. Deborah L. Markowitz, In Pursuit of Equality: One Woman's Work to Change the Law, 14

WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 335, 335 (1992).
3. Id. at 337.
4. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Treatment of Women by the Law: Awakening Consciousness in the
Law Schools, 5 VAL. U. L. REV. 480 (1971); reprinted in infra section II.
5. Id. at 481.
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courtroom setting. 6 At this time, Judge Ginsburg stated, "The brightest signal
of the changed complexion of our profession is the appointment of Sandra Day
O'Connor to the Supreme Court. Even on that highest court, I predict that
within the decade women's place will no longer be singular.
"'

Her words were prophetic, and just over a decade later, President Clinton
appointed Ruth Bader Ginsburg to serve on the United States Supreme Court.
Indeed, the presence of women on the highest court in the land is no longer
"singular." -Ed.8
I. 1993: HEARINGS ON THE NOMINATION OF RUTH BADER GINSBURG TO BE
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT*
UNITED STATES SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE

JULY 20, 1993
...
I have been deeply moved by the outpouring of good wishes received
in recent weeks from family, neighbors, campmates, classmates, students at
Rutgers and Columbia, law-teaching colleagues, lawyers with whom I have
worked, judges across the country, and many women and men who do not know
me. That huge, spirit lifting collection shows that for many of our people, an
individual's sex is no longer remarkable, or even unusual, with regard to his or
her qualifications to serve on the Supreme Court.

Indeed, in my lifetime, I expect to see three, four, and perhaps even more
women on the High Court bench, women not shaped from the same mold, but
of different complexions. Yes, there are still miles in front, but what a distance
we have traveled from the day President Thomas Jefferson told his Secretary of
State: "The appointment of women to [public] office is an innovation for which
the public is not prepared. Nor [Jefferson added] am I."
The increasingly full use of the talent of all of this nation's people holds
large promise for the future, but we could not have come to this point-and I
surely would not be in this room today-without the determined efforts of men
and women who kept dreams of equal citizenship alive in days when few would
listen. People like Susan B. Anthony, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and Harriet

6. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Women's Work: The Place of Women in Law Schools, 32 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 272, 274-75 (1982), reprinted in part in infra section 1.
7. Id. at 273-74.
8. Justice Ginsburg has written prolifically on gender issues, as well as on many other legal
subjects. For a complete listing of her publications, see infra section V.
* Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to be Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993) (statement
of Ruth Bader Ginsburg).
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Tubman come to mind. I stand on the shoulders of those brave people....
II.

1971:

TREATMENT OF WOMEN BY THE LAW:

AWAKENING CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE LAW SCHOOLS*
INTRODUCTION
The question of sex roles in contemporary

society is rapidly gaining

recognition as an appropriate focus of academic attention in university
undergraduate and graduate programs.' For the law schools, Leo Kanowitz's
pioneering study, Women and the Law,2 indicated the need and potential for
courses and seminars devoted to a fresh and concentrated examination of sexbased discrimination. Within the past two years, electives have appeared in the
programs of a few law schools responding to increasing demands for advertence
to the role of the law in delineating the status of women. These courses develop
two themes: the part law has played in assisting society to "protect" women
(and keep them in their place) and the stimulus law might provide in the
evolution of society toward equality and independence for the still submissive
3
sex.

Law schools have not kept pace with developments in the university world
generally. Although offerings relating to sex roles in our society have been
instituted in dozens of universities and colleges, at the end of 1970 less than ten
law schools offered electives in this field. But efforts now underway to publish
teaching materials for use in Women and the Law survey courses4 may result
* This article is based on remarks made by Ruth Bader Ginsburg as a participant in a panel
discussion on treatment of women by the law presented at the annual meeting of the Association of
American Law Schools on December27, 1970, and is reprinted from 5 VAL. U. L. REV. 480 (1971)
with the permission of the author. At the time this article was written, Justice Ginsburg was a
professor at Rutgers (Newark) Law School.
1. See SHEIA TOBIA, FEMALE STUDIES I (KNOW, Inc. 1970) (college syllabi and reading lists
in social and behavioral sciences); FLORENCE HOWE, FEMALE STUDIES II (KNOW, Inc. 1970)
(college syllabi and reading lists in literature and fine arts).
2. LEO KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW (1969).
3. Cf. Faith A. Seidenberg, The Submissive Majority: Modern Trends in the Law Concerning
Women's Rights, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 262 (1970). The eventual goal which law should serve has
been aptly described as "the emancipation of man." See Address by Swedish Prime Minister Olof
Palme, Women's National Democratic Club, June 8, 1970.
4. Faculty and students involved in Women and the Law programs at the law schools of Yale,
Georgetown, George Washington, and New York University are currently engaged in the
development of survey course materials. Professor Leo Kanowitz of the University of New Mexico
Law School and Professor Kenneth M. Davidson of the State University of New York at Buffalo
teach and continue to develop materials for survey courses on sex-based discrimination. A Women's
Rights Law Reporter, edited by Ann Marie Boylan, is scheduled for publication every other month
commencing in February, 1971.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1994

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 4 [1994], Art. 1

1164

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

in a significant increase in the number of schools with offerings in this area.
Inclusion of an elective course or seminar on Women and the Law (or sexbased discrimination), important as that development is, should not acquit the
law school of academic responsibility, a sincere commitment to develop in law
students sensitivity to the important social movement for the reexamination of
traditional sex roles requires more extensive effort. Enrollment in elective
Women and the Law courses will account for a relatively small percent of the
student body, and, at least initially, female enrollees will no doubt comprise a
majority. To raise consciousness in the law school community generally, the
good will and effort of teachers of standard curricular offerings is required.
Two jobs merit immediate attention: 1) the elimination from law school texts
and classroom presentations of attempts at comic relief via stereotyped
characterizations of women; 2) the infusion into standard curricular offerings of
material on sex-based discrimination. The second is the major assignment; the
first is already underway as a result of sensitivity training given to law school
professors by the increasing number of female students attending their classes
and reading their materials.5
ELIMINATION OF STEREOTYPES

Two examples should suffice to illustrate obsolescence of the kind of humor
in vogue when legal education was a male preserve. 6 A well-known first year
property casebook, published in 1968,' noting common law and modem
solutions to the hiatus problem that can arise in connection with a life estate per
autre vie, makes this parenthetical comment: "[Flor, after all, land, like
woman, was meant to be possessed ... ." Indicative of the change that two
years has wrought, a current collaborator of the author of that 1968 text reports
this 1970 experience:
In preparing a casebook on Land Transfer and Finance soon to be
published, I worked up a set of mimeographed materials to try out on
a seminar. One of the topics treated was real estate brokerage and one
of the questions there involved (which has puzzled many writers and

5. See preliminary statistical compilation of responses to a questionnaire sent to law school

deans by the Association of American Law Schools Special Committee on Women in Legal
Education, December 22, 1970 (indicating an overall increase inthe percentage of women entering
law schools during the period 1966-1970 from 4.30% to 7.82% and 25 of 76 responding schools
with 10% or more female enrollment in 1970-71).
6. One member of the Association of American Law Schools, Washington and Lee University
Law School, remains an all-male institution accepting no women students. In 1972, Washington and
Lee began admitting women as law stdents. -Ed.
7.

CURTIS J. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE (1968).

8. Id. at 139.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol28/iss4/1

Ginsburg: The Progression of Women in the Law

1994]

RUTH BADER GINSBURG

1165

lawyers) was, "How come there's so much litigation involving
brokers?" After presenting some miscellaneous material bearing on
this question, I concluded the topic in my own words, thus, "In
forming your own theory as to why there is so much litigation, it may
be useful to note that 40% of all real estate brokers are women."
When this material was distributed, it was suggested to me by several
women students who used it that the conjecture indicated a certain bias
on my part. (The author had not checked for correlations with
religious affiliation, national origin, height or hair color.) Not wishing
to wound, and deciding that the remark was pretty elephantine humor
in any event, I deleted it.9
"Elephantine humor" of this nature is probably less frequent than
inadvertent disregard of matters of important concern to women. For example,
a colleague engaged several months ago in the preparation of an article
concerning compensatory treatment for blacks made the comment that "few
would bother to argue that special protective legislation for women workers not
extended to males is unconstitutional."10 At the time this comment was
written, several women had already appealed to the courts to spare them from
such "compensatory and preferential treatment,"" and Professor Kanowitz had
persuasively challenged its constitutionality. 2 But change is in the wind, and
perhaps before long we may even see a response to a comment made forty years
ago concerning judicial discourse on that paragon, the reasonable man: "In all
that mass of authorities which bears upon this branch of the law, there is no
single mention of the reasonable woman."13
CURRICULUM CHANGES

Turning to the more serious problem of new infusions into existing
offerings, a sideglance at developments in other areas of law school attention is

9. See ALLAN AxELROD ET AL., CASES ON LAND TRANSFER AND FINANCE (1971). The report
presented in the text was made by Professor Allan Axelrod of Rutgers (Newark) Law School who
now possesses a keen sensitivity on questions of sex-based discrimination.
10. Frank Askin, The Casefor Compensatory Treatment, 24 RuToERs L. Rnv. 65, 74 (1970).
Prior to publication, this qualifying footnote remark was added: "Though it is questionable whether
such legislation is in fact preferential, the courts have never had any difficulty justifying such
'preferences' under the 14th amendment." Id. n.32. But cf Mengelkoch v. Industrial Welfare
Comm'n, 437 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1971).
11. See Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 265-68.
12. KANowrrZ, supra note 2, at 179-82; cf Remarks by Leo Kanowitz on the Equal Rights
Amendment, 116 CONG. REC. S15274 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1970).
13. A.P. HERBERT, MISLEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAw 16 (1930), quoted in WILIAM
PROSSER, TORTS 154 (3d ed. 1964) and CHARLES 0. GREGORY & HARRY KALVEN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 101 (2d ed. 1969).
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useful. Poverty law courses are a relative newcomer on the law school scene.
Initially, elective survey courses began to appear in law school catalogues.
Lately, the effort is not confined to improvement of survey courses but has
expanded to the reshaping of materials in traditional offerings to encompass legal
problems of particular concern to economically disadvantaged people. 4
Also instructive is the attitude and approach of scholars concerned with the
teaching of comparative law. Relatively few students are exposed to the special
elective courses, but horizons have been broadened via references in basic
course materials to practices and problem solutions abroad. 5
A look at outlines, reading assignments and bibliographies in Women and
the Law survey courses would suggest several possibilities to teachers of
traditional offerings. Reflections of the dependent, submissive role envisioned
for women by the dominant sex 6 can be found in such diverse areas as
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Property, Labor Law, Family Law and
Taxation. A few random illustrations will be noted here.

14. See, e.g., HERBERT SEMMEL, SOCIAL JUSTICE THROUGH LAW: NEW APPROACHES IN THE
LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1970); MARION W. BENFIELD, SOCIAL JUSTICE THROUGH LAW: NEW
APPROACHES IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1970); S. PLAGER, SOCIAL JUSTICE THROUGH LAW:
NEW APPROACHES IN THE LAW OF PROPERTY (1970).
The status of women should figure importantly in presentations concerning problems of the
economically disadvantaged, for almost two-thirds of the nation's adult poor are women. See
PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, A MATTER OF SIMPLE

JUSTICE 24 (1970).

Cy. id. at 21:

Without any question, the growing number of families on Aid to Families with
Dependent Children is related to the increase in unemployed young women. For many
... the inability to find a job means . . . having a child to get on welfare. Potential
husbands do not earn enough to support an unemployed wife.
The stability of the low-income family depends as much on training women for
employment as it does on training men ....
The task force expects welfare rolls will continue to rise unless society takes more
seriously the need of disadvantaged girls and young women.
Women are plaintiffs in many of the leading cases dealing with problems of the non-affluent.
E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right of new residents to welfare); Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (wage garnishment).
15. See, e.g., MAURICE ROSENBERG Er AL., ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1970).
16. Even in decisions responding affirmatively to women's claims for equal treatment,
traditional attitudes concerning woman's ordinary function are apparent. See Montgomery v.
Stephens, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960).
Her duties
[l]n today's society the wife's position is analogous to that of a partner ....
and responsibilities in respect of the family unit complement those of the husband,
extending only to another sphere. In the good times she lights the hearth with her own
inimitable glow. But when tragedy strikes it is a part of her unique glory that, forsaking
the shelter, the comfort and warmth of the home, she puts her arm and shoulder to the
plow.
Id. at 48-49, 101 N.W.2d at 234.
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Constitutional Law is probably the most conspicuous area in which
treatment of women by the law has been overlooked in the law schools.
Standard casebooks deal with problems of classification and discrimination
relating principally to race, but also to alienage, condition of birth, and
economic situation. Two cases involving women are generally reported or
extracted in historical context but not from the perspective at which
contemporary feminists view them. Muller v. Oregon,' 7 upholding state
legislation limiting working hours for women after the Supreme Court had
rejected a state attempt at hours limitation applicable to both sexes,", is noted
as one of a series marking the Supreme Court's retreat from substantive due
process limitation on state economic regulation and as the occasion of the
initiation of the Brandeis brief.' 9 Goesaert v. Cleary,' upholding a statute
which kept bar ownership a male monopoly, is noted in the context of traditional
equal protection standards and state restrictions on a business entry. 2' Not
even a note suggests the relationship of these decisions to the current
controversy surrounding equal rights for women. Indeed, the proposed Equal
Rights Amendment,' although it has been in the congressional hopper for
decades, is not mentioned.
It would be unthinkable to omit Brown v. Board of Education from a
contemporary Constitutional Law course. Yet none of the texts, and probably
few class discussions, treat related issues currently pressed before federal courts:
May a state operated institution, consistent with the fourteenth amendment, deny
women educational opportunities afforded to men; and further, is Plessy v.
Ferguson' a viable doctrine with respect to sex segregation? 2'

17. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).

18. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
19. EDWARD L. BARRETT er AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 670-71 (3d ed. 1968); PAUL A.
FREUND Er AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1621 (3d ed. 1967); GERALD GUNTHER & NOEL T.
DOWLING, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 963-64 (8th ed. 1970); WILLIAM B. LOCKHART Er AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 494 (2d ed. 1967).
20. 335 U.S. 464 (1948). But cf infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
21.

FREUND ET AL., supra note 19, at 1082; GUNTHER&

DOWUING, supra note 19, at 995.

22. "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
by any State on account of sex." See Remarks by Professor Leo Kanowitz on the Equal Rights
Amendment, 116 CONG. REc. S15274 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1970).
23. 374 U.S. 483 (1954).
24. 136 U.S. 537 (1896).
25. See Kirstein v. University of Virginia, 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970) (three-judge
court) (exclusion of women from educational opportunities afforded to men by a state institution held
inconsonant with equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment); Note, The Constitutionalityof
Sex Separationin School DesegregationPlans, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 296 (1970). But see Williams
v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970) (three-judge court) (females-only admission policy for
state supported college does not violate male students' right to equal protection where no showing
was made of any feature rendering an all-female facility more advantageous educationally than state
supported institutions to which males are admitted); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles
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In the area of taxation, law school faculties direct hiring committees to
search for teachers interested in "policy" questions as well as analysis of .the
intricate chess game playable under the Internal Revenue Code. How many
introductory courses, however, acquaint students with the deliberate and
significant disincentive current tax law presents to the woman who contemplates
combining a career with marriage and a family? If her earnings approach those
of her husband, the Code counsels divorce, for the couple will retain more if
they live together without benefit of a marriage license.' And if a father or
mother goes off to work, as a divorcee he or she may be entitled to a child care
deduction regardless of income. For a married pair, both working, however,
the deduction is available only if joint adjusted gross income of the couple
remains close to the subsistence level.27
The tax teacher interested in "policy" might well contrast in this area the
approach taken by Sweden in its recent reform. The Swedish system resembled
the system in effect in the United States; by relating a wife's income to her
husband's, it discouraged wives from working. The new system introduces
individual taxation; every person, married or not, is taxed on earned income
separately and under a uniformly applicable graduated rate schedule.' And for
those who see an impediment in this country because some of our states have a
community property system, the Swedish answer is enlightening. That nation
retains the institution of a community severed upon termination of marriage,2
but for income tax purposes, a concept basic in other areas of our own tax law
is applied-income is taxed to the one who earns it.3
In Conflict of Laws, issues relating to the status of women appear in

of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 33 (1959) ("Does enforced separation of the sexes
discriminate against females merely because it may be the females who resent it and it is imposed
by judgments predominantly male?")
26. See Britt Richards, Single v. Married Income Tax Returns Under the Tax Reform Act of
1969, 48 TAXES 301 (1970).
27. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 214. See also PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS
AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 14.

Under present law a husband-wife family benefit from the deduction only if their income
does not exceed $6,600 with one dependent or $6,900 with two or more dependents.
. . . There is no income limitation on the single head of a household (single women,
widow, widower, divorced person), and there seems to be no good reason for limiting
the deduction to low-income husband-wife families.
Id. at 15.
28. An explanation of the purposes of the reform appears in the English language publication,
SWEDEN NOW, April, 1970, at 5-6. To avoid harsh effects on families long accustomed to the
former system, transition period provisions have been made. See Address by Palme, supra note 3.
29. See Howard S. Sussman, Spouses and Their Property Under Swedish Law, 12 AM. J.
COMP. L. 553 (1963).
30. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
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diverse contexts; sometimes they appear saliently, as in the cases concerning
married women's contracts. In other instances, they are less conspicuous. For
example, casebooks currently in use report or note a 1967 decision of the
Oregon Supreme Court3 as illustrative of a "true conflicts" case. The court
wrestled with the problem of whether to apply forum law, allowing a forum
wife to collect for loss of consortium, or the law of the place of injury which
allowed such recovery to a husband and not a wife.
Oregon took a
"restrained," if not "enlightened," view and deferred to the law of the state
where the accident occurred. The court barely considered the possibility of a
"no conflict" solution; if the sister state law, recognizing a right in the husband
but not in the wife, had been put to the rational classification test of the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, the higher authority of the
Constitution should have resolved the conflict.32 Sauce for the gander should
serve as sauce for the goose as well.
Developing environmental courses inevitably must deal with the problem
of population increase; in that context controversial questions surrounding birth
control and abortion cannot be ignored.33 Additionally, in the clinical
enterprises now so much in the limelight, sex equality and women's rights cases
could be added to the docket. A few examples of cases in which student
assistance has been sought at Rutgers are illustrative. A bachelor, qualified in
all other respects for the $600 dependent care deduction provided by section
214(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, is disallowed that deduction solely on the
ground of his status as a single man who has never been married. Concededly,
the deduction he sought for the care of his incapacitated dependent mother would
have been available had the taxpayer been a single woman, or a widowed or
divorced person of either sex.'
A woman honorably discharged from the
army due to pregnancy seeks to reenlist. Although she is childless at the time
of her reenlistment application, the army regulations tell her that her past
pregnancy constitutes a "nonwaivable moral and administrative disqualification"

31. Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng'r Co., 247 Ore. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967).
32. Compare Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng'r Co., 247 Ore. 274, 289 n.7, 428 P.2d 898,
906 n.7 (1967), with Owen v. Illinois Baking Corp., 260 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. Mich. 1966);
Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 508, 239 N.E.2d 897, 903, 293 N.Y.S.2d
305, 312 (1968). Contra Miskunas v. Union Carbide Corp., 399 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1066 (1969).
33. See, e.g., State v. Munson (Cir. Ct. S.D., filed April 7, 1970), reportedin 15 S.D.L. Riv.
332 (1970), posing, rhetorically, these questions: "Are the interests of society being served by
women bearing unwanted children, subject to the pressures of an emotionally and financially
deprived existence? Are the interests of society being served by the population explosion we are
now witnessing?" Id. at 333. See also Defusing the PopulationBomb, TRIAL, Aug.-Sept., 1970,
at 10-11, 13-16.
34. Charles E. Moritz, 55 T.C. No. 14 (Oct. 22, 1970).
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to reentry.35 No such disqualification exists for the man who bore equal
responsibility for the pregnancy. A teacher wishes to challenge a school board
requirement that she leave in the fifth month of pregnancy, although her doctor
affirms that her physical and mental capacities to teach remain unaffected by her
pregnancy.s
Women seeking employment in fields for which they are
qualified find that, despite Title VII, 3" employers continue to advertise in "help
wanted-male" columns. If newspapers that maintain such columns are not
subject to the law, as a federal district court has ruled,' are other enforcement
possibilities "with clout" available?39 Women seek admission to an all-male
college operated by a state university; if turned down, they wish to seek relief
in the courts.'
CONCLUSION

Law schools can contribute significantly to the awakening process essential
to shorten the distance between women and equal opportunity. At this juncture,
with increasing female enrollment and a start toward academic attention to sexbased discrimination, law schools are approaching a mid-passage state. Lawyers
and judges whose sensitivity has been developed in the law schools should be
incapable of the kind of reaction still prevalent in some judicial arenas. For
example, in a 1970 decision, 4' a New York trial court rejected the challenge
of a female plaintiff to a jury system with automatic exemptions for women; as
a result of these exemptions, women constituted less that twenty percent of the
available jury pool. In his published opinion, the judge advised the complainant

35. Army Reg. 601-280, Table 2-4, line AE, March 16, 1970. The Army ultimately waived
the "nonwaivable" regulation for the particular case and, in common with other branches of the
armed forces, is currently reviewing its positions relating to pregnancy, parenthood and dependents
of women in the service.
36. See CITIZEN'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN,

STATEMENT

OF

PRINCIPLES (Oct. 29, 1970) Gob-related maternity benefits).
37. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 702-16, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1964).
38. Brush v. San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co., 315 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
39. Notice might be given to the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service concerning
employers and agencies who advertise in sex segregated columns when sex does not constitute a
bona fide occupational qualification; it is highly questionable whether business expense deductions
should be allowed for these illegal expenses. Cf. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356
U.S. 30 (1958).
40. Cf Kirstein v. University of Virginia, 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970) (three-judge
court).
41. De Kosenko v. Brandt, 63 Misc. 2d 895, 313 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Sup. Ct. 1970). Cf Reed
v. Reed, 93 Idaho 511, 465 P.2d 635 (1970), prob. juris. noted, 91 S. Ct. 917 (1971) (statute
requiring that males must be preferred to females related in the same degree for appointment as
administrators of a decedent's estate held consonant with the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment). In 1971, the United States Supreme Courtdecided Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971),
and found that a statute preferring men as executors of estates was inconsistent with the Equal
Protection Clause. -Ed.
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that she was "in the wrong forum." In his view, "[h]er lament should be
addressed to the 'Nineteenth Amendment State of Womanhood' which prefers
cleaning and cooking, rearing of children and television soap operas, bridge and
canasta, the beauty parlor and shopping, to becoming embroiled in plaintiff's
problems .... "42
A more hopeful model for the future was set recently by the New Jersey
Supreme Court.43 Despite the contrary 1948 United States Supreme Court
precedent," a local ordinance denying women the right to tavern employment
behind the bar was declared invalid. Significantly, the plaintiffs were a male
tavern owner who wished the freedom to select a woman bartender and an
association of tavern owners.'
The New Jersey Supreme Court was not
prepared to overrule the ultimate tribunal on constitutional questions' but did
consider itself in full control of the exercise of police power within New Jersey.
It ruled that in light of current customs and mores, "the municipal restriction
against female bartending may no longer fairly be viewed as a necessary and
reasonable exercise of the police power."' In the 1970s, thought and energy
directed toward the unfinished business of equality for women should yield
general application of the New Jersey pronouncement concerning the issue
before it: the law may not tolerate blanket exclusions grounded solely on
sex.' So be it!

42. 63 Misc. 2d at 898, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 830. Compare id. at 829 ("What woman would want
to expose herself to the peering eyes of women only?") with Diaz v. Pan American World Airways,
311 F. Supp. 559, 565-67 (S.D. Fla. 1970) ("women passengers might consider personal overtures
by male attendants as intrusive and inappropriate, while at the same time welcoming the attentions
and conversation of another woman.").
43. Paterson Tavern & Grill Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Hawthorne, 57 N.J. 180, 270
A.2d 628 (1948).
44. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
45. Cf. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Grabiec, 317 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Ill.
1970) (hours
restrictions imposed upon women by the Illinois Female Employment Act declared inconsistent with
Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964; plaintiffs were employers who contended that the
state "protective" legislation prevented them from promoting or assigning female employees to jobs
requiring overtime).
46. But cf.Seidenberg v. MeSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(tavern's limitation of patronage to men violates equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment).
47. 57 N.J. at 186, 270 A.2d at 631.
48. Id. at 189, 270 A.2d at 633. Cf.Mengelkochv. Industrial Welfare Comm'n, 437 F.2d 563
(9th Cir. 1971) (female employee's equal protection challenge to state law limiting hours women can
work presents substantial constitutional question requiring decision by a three-judge federal court).
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WOMEN'S WORK: THE PLACE OF WOMEN
IN LAW SCHOOLS*

For seventeen years of my life in the law, I served as a law teacher. When
I started in the law-teaching business in 1963, few women appeared on my
seating charts, perhaps 5 or 6 in a class of over 100. By 1980, across the
country, women comprised over one-third of total law-school enrollment, up
from 3.6 percent in 1963 and 9.5 percent in 1971.' In more than a few law
schools today, fifty percent or more of the students are women. It is an
appropriate time to indulge in a few memories of things past and to express the
exhilaration I feel about the alterations that have occurred.
A matching change is in sight on the other side of the podium. The change
was documented a year ago in an American Bar Foundation report. 2 In 1950,
in all ABA-accredited law schools, 5 women were engaged as full-time tenuretrack teachers.3 Literally, women who worked as law teachers could be
counted on the fingers of one hand. When the women numbered 5, the male
count was over 1200. By 1967, when women neared 4 percent of all lawyers,
they were only 1.7 percent of all tenure-track law teachers. 4 A dozen years
later, in 1979, the 1.7 percent had increased to 15 percent and the numbers,
from 39 in 1967 to 516 on the verge of the 1980s.' . . .
. . . The brightest signal of the changed complexion of our profession is the
appointment of Sandra Day O'Connor to the Supreme Court. Even on that
highest court, I predict that within the decade women's place will no longer be
singular.
With women at the bar (and even on the bench) no longer curiosities, bar
associations, law schools, law firms, and other organizations are beginning to
consider the question, does that development have any ramifications for our
operations? Is women's participation in the legal profession in numbers
affecting the way law business is conducted? It may be too soon for definitive
answers. Early conjecture, I think, was short-sighted.

* Women's Work: The Place of Women in Law Schools, by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, is reprinted
from 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 272 (1982). Copyright 0 1982 by Association of American Law Schools.
Reproduced with the permission of the author and publisher. At the time this article was written,
Justice Ginsburg was a judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
1. See ABA Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, Law Schools and Bar
Admission Requirements: A Review of Legal Education in the United States (1980-1981).
2. Donna Fossum, Women Law Professors, 1980 A.B.F. RESEARCH J. 903.
3. Id. at 905.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 914.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol28/iss4/1

Ginsburg: The Progression of Women in the Law

1994]

RUTH BADER GINSBURG

1173

My first encounter with the question-what will women's participation
mean?-occurred at the Association of American Law Schools' Annual Meeting
in 1971. Conversation was stimulated by the prediction that a law school
populated by as many women as men was not very far down the road. One of
the participants in the discussion, after a moment of apparent insecurity, smiled,
confident again as law professors often are, and said with assurance, business
would go on as usual, nothing significant would change. What were women
lawyers after all? Simply soft men.
A colleague added the following view. Women lawyers come in two
varieties. First, there are the social workers, the ones that devote themselves
to the poor and the oppressed, the truly needy. That type was not cause for
concern. The social workers do not figure at all in the real world of legal
business, the professor said. Second, there are the backstagers, women who
would find congenial work in drafting wills and contracts, and research and brief
writing. The rough-and-tumble, knock-down-drag-out adversary confrontations
would continue, as always, he concluded, with hard men center stage.
As I see it, the social-worker stereotype of women earning law degrees in
the 1950s and 1960s does hold up to this extent: many of those women are
sympathetic to and active in humanitarian causes. But so are many men who
have experienced discrimination or sensed the injustice of subordinate status,
assigned without regard to one's ability or individual potential to achieve.
I would like to close by borrowing some lines from sociologist Cynthia
Fuchs Epstein's book just off the press, titled Women in Law.6 Professor
Epstein documents how women have succeeded in making their way into law
schools and the legal profession, despite the fact that they were not wanted.
That women lawyers have done well, Professor Epstein concludes, is not
surprising to any but the prejudiced. She predicts, and I share her view, that
not only will women at the bar continue to do well, they will do so with a
certain idealism and humanity, simply because those qualities are expected from
them. But Professor Epstein urges, and again I agree, that society not assign
to women, simply because they are women, the role of guardian of social
consciousness. Humane concern, she writes, ought not be labeled "women's
work"; it should be the work of all. And law schools, as I see it, have an
important role in encouraging students to pursue that concern throughout their
careers at the bar.

6.

CYNTHIA

FucHs EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAw (1981).
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IV. 1993: INVESTITURE OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG*

THE WHITE HOUSE
AUGUST 10, 1993

Not yet two months ago, President Clinton announced his intention to
nominate me as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.
I said then that, if confirmed, I would try in every way to justify his faith in me.
I renew that pledge this afternoon, in the presence of people I hold dear-my
family, colleagues, co-workers, and treasured friends....
This weekend I attended a celebration of women lawyers in New York.
The keynote speaker was our grand Attorney General, Janet Reno. It may have
been the best attended event; it surely was the most remarkable celebration at
the American Bar Association's Annual Meeting. Awards were made in the
name of Margaret Brent, a great lady of the mid-1600s, celebrated as first
woman lawyer in America. Her position as a woman, yet a possessor of power,
so confused her contemporaries that she was sometimes named in court records,
not as Mistress Margaret Brent, but as Gentleman Margaret Brent.
Times are changing. The President made that clear by appointing me, and
just last week naming five other women to Article III courts. Six of his total of
fourteen federal bench nominees thus far are women.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor recently quoted Minnesota Supreme Court
Justice Jeanne Coyne, who was asked: Do women judges decide cases
differently by virtue of being women? Justice Coyne replied that, in her
experience, "a wise old man and a wise old woman reach the same conclusion."
I agree, but I also have no doubt that women, like persons of different racial
groups and ethnic origins, contribute what a fine jurist, the late Fifth Circuit
Judge Alvin Rubin, described as "a distinctive medley of views influenced by
differences in biology, cultural impact, and life experience." A system of
justice will be the richer for diversity of background and experience. It will be
poorer, in terms of appreciating what is at stake and the impact of its judgments,
if all of its members are cast from the same mold.
I was impressed by the description of women at the bar by one of the 1993
Margaret Brent prize recipients, Esther Rothstein, an attorney in private practice
in Chicago. Esther said she found women attorneys to be tough yet tender,
wanting to win but not vindictive, cautiously optimistic with the sense to settle

* Statement of Ruth Bader Ginsburg (Aug. 10, 1993) (on file with the Valparaiso University
Law Review).
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for victories that do not leave one's opponent bloodied and bowed, willing to be
a link in a chain that is strong, yet pliable.
In my lifetime, I expect, there will be among federal judicial nominees,
based on the excellence of their qualifications, as many sisters- as brothers-inlaw. That prospect is indeed cause for hope, and its realization will be cause
for celebration.
V.

PUBLICATIONS OF RUTH BADER GINSBURG

A. Books
CIVIL PROCEDURE IN SWEDEN

(1965) (with Anders Bruzelius)

SWEDISH CODE OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE (1968) (with Anders Bruzelius)

Volume editor, 1 BUSINESS

REGULATION IN THE COMMON MARKET NATIONS

(1969)
TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION (1974,

Supp.

1978) (with Herma Hill Kay and Kenneth M. Davidson; supplement with Herma
Hill Kay)
B. Monographs
A SELECTIVE SURVEY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE STUDIES ON SCANDINAVIAN LAW

(1970)
THE LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN UNDER FEDERAL LAW (with Brenda Feigen

Fasteau) (1974) (report to U.S. Commission on Civil Rights)
CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION (1974)

C. Articles
ProfessionalLegal Assistance in Sweden, 11 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 997 (1962)
(with Anders Bruzelius)
The Jury and the Namnd, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 253 (1963)
Special Findingsand Jury Unanimity in the FederalCourts, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
256 (1965)

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1994

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 4 [1994], Art. 1

1176

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

The Competent Court in Private InternationalLaw, 20 RUTGERS L. REv. 89

(1965)
Chapters (with co-authors) on Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, in
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN LITIGATION 58,

105, 281, 333 (H. Smit ed.,

1965)
Civil Procedure, Basic Features of the Swedish System, 14 AM. J. OF COMP.
LAW 336 (1965)
Proofof Foreign Law in Sweden, 14 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. (1965)
Judgments in Search of Full Faith and Credit, 82 HARV. L. REV. 798 (1969)

Recognition and Execution of Foreign Civil Judgments and ArbitrationAwards,
in

LEGAL THOUGHT

IN

THE UNITED

STATES

UNDER

CONTEMPORARY

PRESSURES 237 (1970)
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Civil Judgments: A Summary View of
the Situation in the United States, 4 INT'L LAWYER 420 (1970)
Notes in INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 1968-1972 on Right of U.S. Lawyers to
Practice Abroad (vol. 3 at 903), Service of Process Abroad (vol. 4 at 150),
Comparative Study of Hearsay Evidence Abroad (vol. 4 at 163), Summary
Adjudication (vol. 4 at 882), Legal Services to Poor People and People of
Limited Means in Foreign Systems (vol. 6 at 128) (all relating to Scandinavian
systems)
Treatment of Women by the Law: Awakening Consciousnessin theLaw Schools,
5 VAL. U. L. REv. 480 (1971).
Sex and Unequal Protection: Men and Women as Victims, 11 J. FAM. LAW 347
(1971)
Comment on Reed v. Reed, 2 WOMEN'S L. REP. 7 (1972)
The Status of Women (Symposium editor), 20 AM. J. COMP. LAW 585 (1972)
Men, Women, and the Constitution, 10 COLUM. J. LAW & Soc. PROBLEMS 91

(1973)
The Need for the Equal Rights Amendment, 59 A.B.A. J. 1013 (1973)

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol28/iss4/1

Ginsburg: The Progression of Women in the Law

1994]

1177

RUTH BADER GINSBURG

Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1975) (Robert S. Marx
Lectures)
Gender in the Supreme Court: The 1973 and 1974 Terms, 1975 Sup. Cr. REV.
1 (1976)
Women As Full Members of the Club: An Evolving American Ideal, 6 HUMAN
RIGHTS 1 (Fall 1977)
Gender-Based Discrimination and the Equal Rights Amendment (Panel
Presentation at 1976 Second Circuit Judicial Conference), 74 F.R.D. 298, 315
Let's Have ERA as a Signal, 63 A.B.A. J. 70 (1977)
Realizing the Equality Principle, in SOCIAL JUSTICE &
TREATMENT 135 (Blackstone & Heslep eds., 1977)
Women, Equality, and the Bakke Case, 4 Civ.
1977)

LIBERTIES

PREFERENTIAL

L. REV. 8 (Nov./Dec.

Women, Men, and the Constitution: Key Supreme CourtRulings, in
21 (National Center for State Courts 1978)

WOMEN IN

THE COURTS

Is the ERA ConstitutionallyNecessary?, UPDATE 16 (A.B.A. Special Committee
on Youth Education for Citizenship, Spring 1978)
From No Rights, to HalfRights, to ConfusingRights, 7 HUMAN
at 12 (May 1978)
Sex Equality and the Constitution: The State of the Art, 4
REP. 143 (Spring 1978)
The Equal Rights Amendment Is the Way, 1 HARV.
1978)
Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52
Dreyfous Lecture)

TULANE

RIGHTS

No. 1,

WOMEN'S RIGHTS

WOMEN'S

L.

L.J. 19 (Spring

L. REv. 451 (1978) (George Abel

Some Thoughts on Benign Classification in the Context of Sex, 10 CONN. L.
REV. 813 (Summer 1978)

Women at the Bar-A Generation of Change, 2 U.
(Fall 1978)

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1994

PUGET SOUND

L. REv. 1

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 4 [1994], Art. 1

1178

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

American Bar Association Delegation Visits People's Republic of China, 64
A.B.A. J. 1516 (1978)
Book Review, Laurence Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw, 92 HARv. L. REV.
340 (Nov. 1978)
A Feminist Lawyer Visits China, 4 WOMEN'S AGENDA 5 (Jan. 1979)
Bakke Decision, 65 WOMEN LAWYERS J. 11 (1979)
All About the E.R.A., COSMOPOLrrAN 166 (1979)
Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments, 1979
WASH. U. L.Q. 161
Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment: A Question of lime, 57 TEx. L.
REV. 919 (1979) (Will E. Orgain Lecture)
A Study Tour of Taiwan's Legal System, 66 A.B.A. J. 165 (1980)
Judicial Authority to Repair Unconstitutional Legislation, 28 CLEVELANDMARSHALL L. REV. 301 (1980) (Cleveland-Marshall Fund Lecture)
Gender in the Supreme Court: The 1976 Term, in CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 217 (R. Collins ed., 1980)
Women's Right to Full Participationin Shaping Society's Course: An Evolving
ConstitutionalPrecept, in TOWARD THE SECOND DECADE 171 (B. Justice & R.
Pore eds., 1981)
Inviting JudicialActivism: A "Liberal"or "Conservative" Technique?, 15 GA.
L. REV. 539 (1981) (John A. Sibley Lecture)
American University Commencement Address, May 10, 1981, 30 AM. U. L.
REV. 891 (1981)
Women's Work: The Place of Women in Law Schools, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 272
(1982)
Columbia's Committee on the '80s, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 282 (1982)
Touring the Law in King Arthur's Court, 61 TEX. L. REV. 341 (1982)

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol28/iss4/1

Ginsburg: The Progression of Women in the Law

1994]

RUTH BADER GINSBURG

1179

The Burger Court's Grapplingwith Sex Discrimination,in THE BURGER COURT:
THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 132 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983)
Commencement Address, OHIO ST. U. L. REc. 25 (Winter 1983)
Reflections on the Independence, Good Behavior, and Workload of Federal
Judges, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1983) (John R. Coen Lecture)
The Work of Professor Allan Delker Vestal, 70 IOWA L. REV. 13 (1984)
Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C.
L. REV. 375 (1985) (William T. Joyner Lecture)
Remarks of the Honorable Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Conference on Civil Rights
Developments, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 1107 (Summer 1985)
The Obligation to Reason Why, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 205 (1985) (Dunwody
Lecture)
Interpretationsof the Equal Protection Clause, 9 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 41
(1986)
Some Thoughts on the 1980's Debate over Special versus Equal Treatment for
Women, 4 J. LAW & INEQUALITY 143 (1986)
Remarks on Appellate Advocacy, 26 IOWA ADVOCATE 18 (Spring/Summer 1987)
(remarks at Iowa College of Law, April 4, 1987)
Commentary, The Intercircuit Committee (with Peter W. Huber), 100 HARV. L.
REV. 1417 (1987)
A Pleafor Legislative Review, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 995 (1987)
Remarks on Women Becoming Partof the Constitution, 6 J. LAW & INEQUALrrY
17 (1988) (remarks at 1987 Eighth Circuit Judicial Conference)
In Memory of the Hon. Burnita Shelton Matthews, in TRIBUTES (District of
Columnbia Circuit Conference, May 22-24, 1988)
La ligitimitg democratique du contrOle de constitutionnalitg, in ET LA
CONSTITUTION CREA L'AMERIQUE 71 (M. Toinet ed., Presses Universitaires de
Nancy 1988)

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1994

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 4 [1994], Art. 1

1180

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITYLAWREV1EW

[Vol. 28

Comment for ConstitutionalBicentennial Conference Dartmouth College, April
21, 1987, in DESIGN AND PRACTICE: THE CONSTITUTION AS A WORKING
DOCUMENT 66-76 (Working Paper Series RC-5/ELP, Nelson A. Rockefeller
Center for the Social Sciences 1988)
Confirming Supreme CourtJustices: Thoughts on the Second OpinionRendered
by the Senate, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 101 (David C. Baum Lecture)
In Memoriam: Judge Carl McGowan, 56

GEO. WASH.

L. REV. 691 (1988)

Articles on Sex Discriminationand Reproductive Autonomy, in CIVIL RIGHTS
AND EQUALITY 291-304, 310-321 (L. Levy, K. Karst, D. Mahoney eds., 1989)
In Memoriam: Judge J. Skelly Wright, 57 GEO.

WASH.

L. REV. 1034 (1989)

Some Reflections on the Feminist Legal Thought of the 1970s (with Barbara
Flagg), 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 9
Remarks on Writing Separately, 65
Lecture)

WASH.

L. REV. 133 (1990) (Jurisprudential

Employment of the Constitutionto Advance the Equal Status of Men and Women,
in THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASES OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE
UNITED STATES (S. Slonim ed., 1990)
On Amending the Constitution: A Pleafor Patience, 12 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK
L.J. 677 (1990) (Ben J. Altheimer Lecture)
On Muteness, Confidence, and Collegiality, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 715 (1990)
Introduction, 1 COLUM. J.

GENDER & LAW 1

(1991)

In Memoriam: Albert M. Sacks, 105 HARv. L. REV. 16 (1991)
A Moderate View on Roe, Guest Column, in 4
(Spring-Summer 1992)
Styles of CollegialJudging, 39

CONSTITUTION

FED. BAR NEWS & J.

No. 2, at 17

199 (1992)

Commencement Remarks, THE ADVOCATE 14 (Lewis & Clark College,
Northwestern School of Law, Winter 1992)
ConstitutionalAdjudication as a Means of Realizing the Equal Stature of Men
and Women Under the Law, 14 TOCQUEVILLE REV. 125 (1993)

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol28/iss4/1

Ginsburg: The Progression of Women in the Law

1994]

RUTH BADER GINSBURG

1181

Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1185 (1992) (James Madison
Lecture, delivered March 9, 1993)
Remarks for George Mason University School of Law Graduation (May 22,
1993), 2 GEORGE MASON INDEPENDENT L. REv. 1 (1993)

D. Supreme Court Litigation
Briefs for Appellants, Appellees, Petitioners

(* indicates presentation of oral argument)
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)
Struck v. Secretary of Defense, cert. granted, 409 U.S. 947, judgment
vacated, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972)
* Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)
* Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974)
* Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
* Edwards v. Healy, 421 U.S. 772 (1975)

(1975)

Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975)
* Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977)
* Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979)
Amicus Briefs

PittsburghPress Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376 (1973)
Cleveland Board of Education v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974)
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wetzel, judgment vacatedfor want of an
appealableorder, 424 U.S. 737 (1976)
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977)
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977)
University of CaliforniaRegents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
Los Angeles, Dep 't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978)
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979)
Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979)
Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980)

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1994

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 4 [1994], Art. 1

1182

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

Brief in Opposition to Certiorari
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Moritz, 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 906 (1973)
Certiorari Petitions Denied
Schattman v. Texas Employment Commission (1972)
Millenson v. New Hotel Monteleone (1973)
Robinson v. Board of Regents (1973)
Junior Chamber of Commerce of Philadelphia v. United States Jaycees
(1974)
Stubblefield v. Tennessee (Jurisdictional Statement) (1974)
Whitlow v. Hodges (1976)
Other
Coffin v. Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (Jurisdictional
Statement 1975)
Jablon v. Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (Jurisdictional
Statement 1975)
Mathews v. Jablon, Mathews v. Coffin (Motion to Affirm 1975)
Vorchheimer v. School District of Pennsylvania (Petition for Certiorari,
Petitioner's Reply Brief, and Brief for Petitioner 1976)

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol28/iss4/1

